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Book Review

 

Caroline Elkins and Susan Peterson (eds.) Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century. New York and Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2005. Pp. xiv + 303. Index. $36.96 (paper).

Christopher Lloyd, Jacob Metzer, and Richard Sutch (eds.), Settler Economies in World History. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013. Pp. xxiii + 605. Index. $179.00 (hardback).

Lionel Pilkington and Fiona Bateman (eds.) Studies in Settler Colonialism: Politics, Identity, and Culture. New York and London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011. Pp. x + 307. Index. $105.00 (hardback).

 

     "Settler colonialism" does not make much of a splash in world history courses. Though they may mention British settlers in Australia, French colons in Algeria, or the lives of Italian migrants in Argentina, such stories are rarely compared. They are, in any case, eclipsed by the larger dramas of 19th century imperialism, from the Sepoy Rebellion to the Partition, from the Opium War to the Revolution, and from the Berlin Conference to African independence.

     The Cambridge International Examination in history does not mention settler colonization at all.1 The Advanced Placement World History framework directs AP instructors to "teach one illustrative example of Europeans who established settler colonies" such as "the British in southern Africa, Australia, and New Zealand … [or] the French in Algeria." Given other demands on their time, few survey courses at any level can meet the expectation this particular sub-clause sets forth.2

     Teachers who, despite all this, want to explore settler colonialism will find little help from academic publishers. There is, as yet, no classroom-ready resource available – not from Bedford Series in History and Culture, Prentice Hall's Connections: Key Themes in World History, Routledge's Themes in World History, Pearson's Seminar Studies in History, or Oxford's Very Short Introductions. In the absence of a handy guide, teachers must cobble curriculum together from raw scholarship. Three recent collections can help.

     Of the three, Settler Economies, edited by Christopher Lloyd, Jacob Meltzer and Richard Sutch, is least likely to end up as a classroom text. Aimed squarely at economic historians, students new to world history will find most of its essays very tough going. At any rate, its price, nearly $200, puts it out of reach for students, most teachers and even some college libraries. That is unfortunate, because it is as comprehensive and useful a collection as we're likely to see for some time. The anthology's strength is comparison. Fourteen of the nineteen essays in Settler Economies compare three or more cases studies, building a global perspective.

     However, Settler Economies adopts a narrow and particular definition of "settler colonization" which, in the end, constrains that global perspective Richard Sutch lays out the five characteristics typical of settler colonies:

  • The settlers… for the most part… become permanent residents in their new home and their offspring inherit the world their parents create.

  • The destination of the settlers is a region characterized by under-utilized natural resources that the settlers intend to exploit.

  • Most settlers are voluntary; not slaves, not bound to work for non-settlers. The settler's motivation is primarily economic; however some might be religious or political refugees (or even criminals involuntarily transported)…

  • The settlers and their offspring come to dominate the economy, the society, and the culture of the region to which they move…

  • The settler society soon becomes self-sustaining in both the economic and demographic senses.3

     How many countries have there been in the last two hundred years which: 1) had their roots in a small group of economically-motivated voluntary migrants, who 2) exploited "under-utilized" natural resources, ultimately 3) building a self-sustaining and dominant society? Settler Economies' answer is seven: Argentina, Uruguay, the United States, Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, which contribute about three-quarters of the collection's case studies. New Zealand alone appears in eleven of nineteen chapters. If revenues from Lord of the Rings tourism ever falter, New Zealand can sell itself as economic history's universal translator.

     Common to all seven were their linkages to the British imperial system through financial institutions, trade, investment and, in the last four cases, continuing migration. Apart from Claude Lützenbach's discussion of Algeria in his essay on settler colonialism in Africa, neither the French nor Portuguese settlements get more than cameos roles in these essays. Though this may disappoint some readers hoping for an even more comprehensive overview, it does give Settler Economies a thematic cohesion often missing from such collections. Broadly speaking, these essays describe the economic foundations of political sovereignty, and will contribute much to ongoing studies of state-building.

     The broad storyline is, roughly, familiar: at first anchored to commodity exports (wool in New Zealand, wheat in Canada, hides in Argentina), settler economies climbed the value chain toward mass consumption, reorienting their economies away from the British metropole with greater or lesser success by 1970. The collection's strength, of course, is in the attention to the details of these broad processes. Three essays give the flavor of the analysis. Grietje Verhoef's study of the role played by financial intermediaries in South Africa's 19th and 20th century economic development emphasizes how closely its few banks were integrated into a British financial system whose conservative lending largely shielded these early institutions from the kind of speculative frenzies and panics that regularly roiled banks in the United States.4

     Bringing the story into the 20th century, Tim Root finds that increasingly volatile capital markets made the road rougher for certain middle-income countries, notably South Africa and Argentina. As the Dominions left Britain's economic orbit, Canada successfully diversified its economy into manufacturing and, after 1945, "was able to benefit from its proximity to the United States." Australia and New Zealand, were particularly before China embarked on its quarter-century of explosive growth, much more vulnerable. While Australian resources (notably coal and iron ore) ultimately found markets in East and Southeast Asia, New Zealand's agricultural products (wool, meat, dairy) faced higher hurdles.5 McAloon narrows the focus to Australia and New Zealand, asking how – and whether – they escaped the "staples trap" between 1940 and 1970. McAloon's culprit isn't capital markets but the economic crisis of the 1970s, which ended the postwar boom "before sufficient progress had been made." This proved a particularly abrupt shock for two countries in the midst of nationalizing fiscal policy along Keynesian lines and spending more aggressively to achieve social democratic aims. 6

     Though the economic trajectories of South Africa, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia diverged after 1945, none did so quite as dramatically as Argentina. During the last decades of the 19th century, growing export of hides, wheat and canned meat attracted British investment in agriculture, food processing, warehousing, and related ventures. It is a cliché that Argentina entered the 20th century as the Sweden of the Western Hemisphere, a settler colony made good. A century later, however, the country had fallen victim to frequent inflation, military dictatorship, economic stagnation, and political corruption.

     Conservatives generally blame Argentina's woes on populist (often Marxist-inflected) economic nationalism associated with "import substitution industrialization" (ISI). The Left, influence both by dependency theory and by liberation theology, has traditionally blamed British and, later, American neocolonialist hegemony. Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff argue that what mattered most was inequality. Lower levels of inequality, they claim,

[lead], over time, to more democratic political institutions, more investment in public goods and infrastructure, and to institutions that offered relatively broad access to property rights and economic opportunities.7

In contrast, by the 20th century, Argentina had become a case study of the growth-killing consequences of growing inequality. Argentina's elites restricted the right to vote longer than comparable countries, while the elites of Buenos Aires, "whose interests favored keeping scarce labor in the province," blocked policies designed to open public land for low-cost homesteading. Concentrated wealth ensured that tax policies burdened those lower on the economic ladder. Though Argentina might have built a far broader middle class by investing in primary and secondary education, the wealthy felt little interest in doing so. This approach, lately made famous by Thomas Piketty, is worth bringing to students' attention.8

     Ultimately, the deepest gulf lay not within coastal settlements but between settlers and increasingly marginalized indigenous peoples. Two essays in Settler Economies are particularly noteworthy – and can be used, with guidance, directly in the classroom. In the first, Frank Tough and Kathleen Dimmer compare the transfer of land from Maoris, Native Americans, and Canadian Métis to the hands of European settlers. Along the way they catalogue in depressing detail the legal fictions and systematic deceits deployed to achieve "non-violent, low cost acquisition of additional Native lands."9 Tough and Dimmer can teach students a great deal about the institutional racism embedded in 19th century legal and administrative structures. They also press home a larger lesson: that this era of chicanery was more than a tawdry episode in the history of human greed enacted on North America's Plains. It was systematic and global, "an 'efficient' factor of production that, in turn, contributed to Anglo-American global dominance." The same point emerges in Tony Ward's essay comparing the economic consequences of European settlement on the Maori to those faced by Canada's Prairie Indians. While the Maori were largely "able, at least initially, to continue their lives" and in some cases participate in new markets, indigenous Canadians found their way of life "almost completely shattered," due in large measure to the government's Indian Agents, who severely constricted their already limited economic options.10

     Writing what is perhaps the most provocative and engaging essay in the collection, Jacob Meltzer considers three instances of "atypical settler colonization" in the mid-19th and early 20th centuries: Mormons in what would become Utah, African-American settlements in Liberia and the Jewish Yishuv in British Palestine. Ambivalent about the societies they had left behind, carrying with them memories of extreme exploitation, exclusion and physical violence, all three nurtured a defensive nationalism. While most settler colonies identified with the metropole and in some fashion served its interests, the Jewish Yishuv, Mormon Deseret and Monrovia's first families at first valued communal self-sufficiency. Sanctioned by divine or historical right, their national projects rejected the counter-claims of indigenous people. Reading Meltzer's account, I thought about the narrowness of classroom comparing, for instance, Israel to French Algeria, Liberia to Sierra Leone, and Utah to California. Fresh comparisons raise new issues.11

     Those engaged by the economic histories collected by Lloyd, Meltzer, and Sutch will find more to think about in two of the essays Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen have edited for Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century. Jun Uchida's study of Japanese and Korean businesses in Japanese-occupied Korea, demonstrates that, while Japanese business elites reinforced their privileged positions in Korea, self-interest compelled them to collaborate with Korean elites "to press for greater political concessions and increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis colonial and metropolitan authorities." However, Japan's Korean interlocutors increasingly used their leverage to press for greater power within the imperial system, destabilizing the system. Roger Owens interrogates the economic motives animating European settler colonies in the Middle East and North Africa. Unlike the Japanese in Korea, settlers in Palestine, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco sought to build agricultural colonies, ideally segregated from (and often hostile to) local elites. Ironically, it took considerable subsidies to sustain limited self-sufficiency. Acknowledging the limited data on smallholdings available from the archives, Owens wonders whether some of these colonies did, in fact, achieve some kind of economic viability. This matters: Did settler identity deepen despite economic hardship and dependence or because of the sense of self-sufficiency that comes with economic success?12

     These essays aside, Elkins and Pedersen define their own project very differently from that of Lloyd, Meltzer, and Sutch. Reading the essays in Settler Economies can leave the impression that from small acorns (European settlements in Botany Bay or on the Rio de la Plata), great nation-state oaks must grow. Elkins and Pedersen do not agree:

Only sometimes do settler projects metamorphose into settler colonialism; only sometimes do colonial states come to adopt the settler-native distinction as their foundation for all law.13

What's more, while most essays in Settler Economies treat colonies as integral to imperial (particularly British) empires, Elkins and Pedersen argue that the two were often at odds. While "imperial overlords" sought "military advantage or trade," they involved themselves "as little as possible with land seizure or internal governance," working instead through "reliable indigenous partners or chartered companies." Settlers, in contrast, wanted a "permanent home while continuing to enjoy metropolitan living standards and political privileges." Thus, "insofar as there was a logic to their approach to the indigenous populations, it was a logic of elimination, and not exploitation…"14

     All this makes Elkins and Pedersen collection quite distinct from that of Lloyd, Meltzer, and Sutch. For a start, Settler Colonialism largely ignores the usual case studies (New Zealand, the United States, Canada, Australia and Argentina). Instead, the collection devotes three essays to the French experience in Algeria, another three to Japan's ill-fated Korean occupation, and one each to apartheid South Africa, to colonial Rhodesia and Kenya, to Portuguese Mozambique, and to Hitler's short-lived and brutal German resettlement of Poland. A last set of essays bring to light unwilling repatriation from three settler colonies after World War II. While Lloyd, Meltzer, and Sutch mine the archives for economic data, Settler Colonialism reveals what it can about the ideologies, memories, and political cultures of both settlers and indigenous peoples.

     The book's final section, "Settler Communities after Decolonization," will serve classrooms particularly well, examining the ways settler experience has been remembered (or forgotten) since the departure of French civilians from Algeria, Japanese from Manchuria, Portuguese from Mozambique and Angola, and South Africans from Namibia.15 Caroline Elkins caps these four essays with a fine overview of "settler tyranny" in Europe's African settler colonies. When the British or French governments "decided to cut their losses and pull out, they often found themselves coping with intransigent settler communities or even terrorist cells determined to go it alone." Vigilante violence was particularly "explosive" because perpetrators saw themselves defending "their home fronts from a subject population defined as ipso facto subhuman because of race."16

     For more on settler and indigenous identity, it is worth a look back to Settler Economies. Claude Lützelschwab's obituary for failed European settler colonialism in East Africa, Algeria, and Zimbabwe asks what "made white disengagement [so] very difficult." Among his conclusions: despite considerable subsidies, many of Europe's African settlers could not make a go of their enterprises without brutally exploiting local labor, making them particularly vulnerable to political change. In another study, Carl Mosk compares three instances of Japanese out-migration. Those who left Japan for Hawai'i, Vancouver Island, and elsewhere on the Pacific Rim may have done so for the same reasons their compatriots relocated to Hokkaido. Yet in Hokkaido they were "settlers," pushing the indigenous Ainu to the wall while establishing, in effect, a settler colony that eventually became an integral part of the Japanese national project. In Hawai'i and Vancouver they were minority "immigrants," facing ambivalence at best and uncompromising hostility at worst.17

     When I taught U.S. history, my students were both amused and confused to learn that, in the mid-19th century, white U.S.-born anti-immigrant activists called themselves "Native American." These essays help make sense of that. At what point do colonists think of themselves as indigenous? When and why do some of these claims stick, as for "Canadians" and "Chileans," while others evaporate, as for Portuguese Angolans? Finally, how do such self-understandings change over time? Elleke Boehmer's explores this last question in an essay for Studies in Settler Colonialism, tracing the transformation of South African nationalism from rigid exclusionism of the apartheid era toward a more "inclusive nationalism." Comparisons with similar trajectories in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States would serve students well.18

     Boehmer teaches World Literature, not history or economics. That background is typical of contributors to Lionel Pilkington and Fiona Bateman's Studies in Settler Colonialism. More than half the contributors are veterans of English, Comparative Lit, or American Studies programs; the rest are largely cultural or social historians. Not surprisingly, essays grant considerable weight to literary sources. Daniel Carey reads Edmund Spenser for insights into "how literature and empire relate" in 16th century Ireland. Karen Kosasa investigates "the spaces of museums and art galleries in Hawai'i" to determine whether the descendants of settlers and later immigrants – now around 90% of the population – can hear the "other settler history" the history native Hawai'ians experienced. (Her conclusion: no). Lorenzo Veracini, asks how both victors and the defeated tell their own stories, a search for "narrative form" that begins with the Odyssey's circuit from the familiar to the dangerously exotic and back again, and ends with the myths of victorious liberators and ousted settlers. David Attwell looks for signs of settler mentality in the South African novelist J.M. Coetzee and finds them.19

Most of the essays, like Boehmer's, make a case for settler colonialism's continuity into the present. "It is misleading," write Bateman and Pilkington, "to refer to settler colonialism in the past tense… the effects are permanent and the process is still current;" each generation descended in blood or imagination from settler colonialism renews ideas of race and nation that justified original hierarchies of colonial power.20 With Faulkner, Bateman and Pilkington insist that the past isn't past. So when John Patrick Montaño's exhumes evidence on Tudor-era English plantations in Ireland, we know that, though buried for half a millennium, the body is still fresh. Montaño tells us that "settlers were convinced that their material culture was a mark of civility, but improvements and change obliterated native history and suppressed native culture," a line that could apply to much more recent colonial projects.21

     If contemporary concerns can be teased out of Montaño's work, they are emerge fully-formed in other essays. Ben Silverstein, for example, documents the early 20th century effort of reform-minded whites to set aside an Aboriginal state in northern Australia, "self-governing and ruled according to traditional laws and customs." This idea derived from recent British experience in Nigeria, where High Commissioner Frederick Lugard had implemented such a system, which he characterized as "indirect rule." The exchange of ideas from one end of the British colonial system to the other is worth student attention. So too are the differences Silverstein highlights between Nigeria and Australia, differences which put Australian policy on a different trajectory from Nigeria, contributing to assimilationist and paternalist attitudes which still echo in Australian politics (witness the Northern Territory Intervention, implemented in 2007). Rather than moving through historical narrative toward contemporary events, a number of articles start there. Laura Lyons, for instance, begins with a look at homelessness in Hawai'i: a disproportionate share of the men and women who sleep rough are Native Hawai'ian. Lyons then reconstructs more than a century of agricultural expropriation and labor exploitation that made this happen. "Settler colonialism," she concludes, "is structured around the transformation of the indigenous into the indigent."22

     The presentism that launches this collection reaches its apogee in Saree Makdisi's essay on Zionism, focusing largely the Israeli novelist Amos Oz. Makdisi lambasts Israeli Oz and other proponents of "soft-core Zionism" who, via the Oslo accords, "allowed the Israelis to stall for time while creating facts on the ground… and deferring all the most important issues to an occasion whose time, inevitably, never seemed to be right." Oz, Makdisi concludes, "may play the Dr Jekyll to [Israeli hardliner Arnon Sofer's] Mr Hyde, but they both share the same soul."23 Makdisi is not alone. Of the seventeen articles in Pilkington and Bateman, four wrestle with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – a quarter of all the essays. Such a focus implies that Israel is a living political fossil, a particularly egregious anachronism of the worst kind of settler colonialism.

     Why devote nearly a quarter of the book to one example? As Pilkington and Bateman acknowledge, "settler colonialism structures relationships as… diverse as those between Chinese and Tibetans [or] Indonesians and Papuans." To these we might add many others. With the enthusiastic support of their respective governments, Han Chinese migrate to Xinjiang, Hindus move into predominantly Muslim Kashmir, and Moroccans settle in Western Sahara. Indeed, of over a thousand "nations" distinguished by language, ethnicity, culture, or religion, just under two hundred identify a sovereign state territory as their own. Many of these states actively experiment with variations on settler colonialism. Zionism may well be a distinct exemplar of "settler colonialism in the twentieth century," but that's a case to be made, not a foundational truth. With four essays on Israelis and Palestinians, there's no room for articles that ask broader questions of contemporary settlement policy.

     Without a comparative frame, questions go hanging. For example, in his essay on Israel and Palestine, Salah Hassan examines the tension between two "incompatible" Palestinian strategies, one "based on individual rights, and the other on collective or national rights." Would Tibetan or Sahrawi or Aboriginal activists frame their political choices in the same way? How would previous generations of the indigenous or of settlers have understood this choice?24 Hassan also compares Jewish settlement in Israel to the France's Algerian colons and South Africa's Afrikaners. Pro-Palestinian sources invoke these analogies as frequently and ritualistically as American cold warriors once invoked Munich. Such kneejerk analogizing, typical of media on both the Left and Right, suppresses the historical imagination, cripples analysis, and stifles debate. It would have been useful to juxtapose Hassan's essay against one asking the same questions in a very different context.25

     As with all projects of such scope, these three volumes cannot do everything. It's possible to imagine a fourth collection that would fill some of the holes. First, many of these articles treat "settlers" and the "indigenous" as near-monolithic categories. What kind of differences (if any) emerged between the first generation of settlers, its children, and its more distant descendants? How did settlers of one cultural background interact with those of another? Why did some indigenous peoples confederate while others did not? When, why, and to what extent did the indigenous come to consider themselves "the indigenous"?

     The essays also seem to define a "settler colony" as, ipso facto, one which segregates settlers from indigenes. For this reason, the three volumes exclude Indonesia, the Philippines, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and most other places where concepts like hybridity, syncretism, and mestizaje might be useful. Yet, in many of these colonial locales, white settlers did try enforcing some kind of color line. Inviting the tropics into the discussion might get students wondering why settlers made segregation more or less of a priority – and why some who valued segregation failed to achieve it.

     Third, few of these essays address gender. In two that do, Jane Carey and Claire McLiskey implicate women's reform movements (Carey) and Christian evangelicalism (McLiskey) in policing the boundaries that safeguarded the families of "White Australia." These stories are not unique to Australia but can be found throughout the late 19th and early 20th century imperial worlds. What other ideas about gender and family spread through the same international networks? Did these movements find a distinct reception in settler colonies? How about the relationship between settler colonialism and family structure, women's labor, and women's voluntary associations?

     Fourth, the articles read 20th century national unification back into history. For instance, "Canada" serves as a single analytical category, though it's easy, for instance, to imagine that, under slightly different historical circumstances, British Columbia would have joined the United States. The counterfactual case for Newfoundland is even easier: this British dominion did not join Canada until 1949, thanks to an electoral majority of just 52%. While "Canada" pulled together, New Zealand remains (so far) independent of Australia. Argentina's port and provinces stuck it out, but Central America's elites pulled apart. Of Britain's twenty-plus settlements, thirteen united in a North American republic. Spain's, however, never came close to achieving Bolívar's dream of unification. Why, in some settler colonies, did centralizers win the day? Why did they fail to do so in others? Where were indigenes, racial outsiders, and the economically marginal in these political struggles?

     Finally, there's the matter of ideology. Taken as a whole, the political range of these fifty-one essays spans the distance from Left to Center-Left, (though Settler Economies does sometimes stray into conservative territory). As I moved through a thousand-plus pages, I found myself wishing for an essay that cut, perhaps savagely, across the grain. Maybe it's just me: I get antsy when I'm around an unchallenged political consensus. Many teachers (most of them, in my experience, Socialists, Social Conservatives, or Libertarians) have a lot of success teaching from the barricades. Plenty of students thank these ideological warriors for challenging their unexamined assumptions and forcing them to think. But other students, seeing themselves as a captive audience to an academic infomercial, either disengage or feed their instructor a diet of fake "opinions" designed to please. As I consider how I'll use these studies in a high school classroom, I already know that I'll need to find counter-arguments and alternative interpretations. The debate has not yet been joined.

     There remains, in the end, a certain poignancy to these three volumes. We live in a world engineered by acquisitive territorial states whose legitimacy and moral authority are everywhere contested. Governments have every reason to feel anxious when teachers take a righteous poke at the state's mythic foundations.

     It is therefore unlikely that any country's school system will permit "settler colonialism" to sneak into its official curriculum. Ministers of Education, many of them implicated in schemes of settlement, assimilation, or exclusion, will continue demanding that schools pay tribute to nationalism. They will demand, as they always have, that students sing Lady Macbeth's rousing patriotic chorus: Out, damned spot! Out!

Tom Laichas teaches history at Crossroads School in Santa Monica, California and is Senior Editor of World History Connected.

 

Notes

1 Cambridge International A & AS Level History Syllabus for Examination in June and November 2013. 11-13. Online at: http://cie.org.uk/images/91906-2013-syllabus.pdf.

2 College Board, AP World History Course and Exam Description, Effective Fall 2011, 67; emphasis in original. More generally, see Key Concept 5.2, "Imperialism and the Nation-State" 66-68.

3 Richard Sutch, "Introduction: Toward a Unified Approach to the Economic History of Settler Economies" in Christopher Lloyd, Jacob Metzer, and Richard Sutch (eds.), Settler Economies in World History. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013, xvii.

4 Grietjie Verhoef, "Financial Intermediaries in Settler Economies: the Role of the Banking Sector Development in South Africa, 1850-2000," Settler Economies, 403-433.

5 Tim Rooth, "International Trade and Investment of the Settler Economies During the Twentieth Century: Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa" in Settler Economies, 437-461.

6 Jim McAloon, "The State and Economic Policy in Twentieth Century Australia and New Zealand: Escaping the Staples Trap?" in Settler Economies, 521-543.

7 Stanley Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, "Five Hundred Years of European Colonization: Inequality and Paths of Development." Settler Economies, 83. For a similar argument, also see Henry Willebald and Luis Bértola, "Uneven Development Paths among Settler Societies, 1870-2000," Settler Economies, 105-140.

8 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014. While Piketty makes very few references to Latin America or to "settler colonies," students reading excerpts from Engerman and Sokoloff might also engage the available debates around Piketty's work.

9 Frank Tough and Kathleen Dimmer, "'Great Frauds and Abuses;' Institutional Innovation at the Colonial Frontier of Private Property: Case Studies of the Individualization of Maori, Indian, and Métis Lands" in Settler Economies, 205-249.

10 Tough and Dimmer, "Great Frauds and Abuses;" Tony Ward, "Aboriginal Economies in Settler Societies: Maori and Canadian Prairie Indians," in Settler Economies, 251-269.

11 Jacob Metzer, "Jews in Mandatory Palestine and Additional Phenomenon of Atypical Settler Colonization in Modern Times," Settler Economies 170-202.

12 Jun Uchida, "Brokers of Empire: Japanese and Korean Business Elites in Colonial Korea," in Caroline Elkins and Susan Peterson (eds.) Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century. New York and Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2005, 153-170; Roger Owen, "Settler Colonization in the Middle East and North Africa: Its Economic Rationale," Settler Colonialism, 171-181.

13 Caroline Elkins and Susan Peterson, "Introduction: Settler Colonialism: A Concept and Its Uses," Settler Colonialism, 2-3.

14 Elkins and Peterson, 2.

15 Benjamin Stora, "The 'Southern' World of the Pieds Noirs: References to and Representations of Europeans in Colonial Algeria," Settler Colonialism, 225-241; Lori Watt, "Imperial Remnants: The Repatriates in Postwar Japan," Settler Colonialism, 240-255; Stephen Lubkemann, "Unsettling the Metropole: Race and Settler Reincorporation in Postcolonial Portugal," Settler Colonialism, 257-270; Jeremy Silvester, "'Sleep with a Southwester': Monuments and Settler Identity in Namibia," Settler Colonialism, 271-286.

16 Caroline Elkins, "Race, Citizenship, and Governance: Settler Tyranny and the End of Empire," Settler Colonialism, 203-222.

17 Claude Lützelschwab, "Settler Colonialism in Africa," Settler Economies 141-167; Carl Mosk, "Three Island Frontiers: Japanese Migration in the Pacific," Settler Economies, 297-313.

18 Elleke Boehmer, "Where We Belong: South Africa as a Settler Colony and the Calibration of African and Afrikaner Identity," Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington, Studies in Settler Colonialism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 269.

19 Daniel Carey, "Spenser, Purchas, and the Poetics of Colonial Settlement," Studies 28-46; Karen Kosasa, "Searching for the 'C' Word: Museums, Art Galleries, and Settler Colonialism in Hawai'i," Studies, 153-167; Lorenzo Veracini, "Telling the End of the Settler Story," Studies, 204-218; David Attwell, "J.M. Coetzee and the Idea of Africa," Studies, 219-236.

20 Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington, "Introduction," Studies, 2.

21 John Patrick Montaño, "'Dycheyng and Hegeying': The Material Culture of the Tudor Plantations in Ireland," Studies, 47-61.

22 Ben Silverstein, "Indirect Rule in Australia: A Case Study in Colonial Difference," Studies, 90-106; Laura E. Lyons, "From Indigenous to the Indigent: Homelessness and Settler Colonialism in Hawai'i," Studies, 140-152.

23 Saree Makdisi, "Zionism Then and Now," Studies, 255.

24 Salah D. Hassan, "Displaced Nations: Israeli Settlers and Palestinian Refugees," Studies, 186-203.

25 See, for instance, Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992) and Richard Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York: Free Press, 1988); Margaret MacMillan, Dangerous Games: The Uses and Abuses of History (New York: Modern Library, 2010 [reprint]).

 

 
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