The Transformational War: A New Understanding of the Ottoman Empire's Long World War I
James N. Tallon
With the centennial of the First World War, discussions around the meaning and impact of the War have resurfaced. These discussions frequently focus almost entirely on the Western Front, even though this was only one part of the War. In these commemorations, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and other regions are often overlooked. The Middle East and the Ottoman Empire are frequently deemphasized or ignored, despite current issues in the region, which have clear links with the First World War. One of the main problems in tying events during the First World War in Eastern Europe, Middle East, and Africa with events on the Western Front is that these region's reasons for war were often very different from those of Western Europe. This is particularly the case in the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East.
The Ottoman Empire, as well as many other states, doesn't fit into neatly into the Western European framework of the War. The years 1914–1918 have significance for the Ottoman Empire, but not in the same manner as in Western Europe. Additionally, the reasons for the Ottoman Empire entering the First World War were significantly different from the Western European combatants.
While it would be unreasonable and inaccurate to shift focus completely away from the Western front, it is valuable for students to see the First World War through the eyes of the Ottoman Empire as well as other combatants, rather than entirely through a Euro-American-centered view. After all it was a world war. In this spirit, this work offers a glimpse into the lived experience of Ottoman junior officers in the Long World War I. Additionally; it will present a different chronology and framework for understanding how the Ottoman Empire and much of the Middle East experienced the First World War.
With this, a key teaching concept will be developed. War and conflicts are not homogenous; they are often fought by different groups for different reasons. Furthermore, not all conflicts begin and end neatly. For many American students and several instructors the Second World War is the template for all conflicts. The Second World War, from an American perspective, has a clear begging and a definite end. This is often not the case. Conflicts and war often simmer long before they bubble over. Likewise, many wars don't have a clear end, occasionally they simply peter out. These ideas are key teaching points for understanding how the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East were involved in the First World War.
In an increasingly global world, older ways of imagining and teaching history need to be revised. Often, a stumbling block to this revision is lack of resources or difficulty in interpreting those resources. What follows below is a new way to think about the Ottoman Empire and the Middle in the context of the Frist World War as well as in the global context both before and after the 1914–1918 conflict. This framework is, by no means, without flaws, but it provides instructors and students a way to think about the First World War in global terms and not simply as a Western European conflict.
The so-called "decline" of the Ottoman Empire remains stock and trade for many World History courses and textbooks. This well-worn template puts forth the idea that the Empire slowly bleeds to death as the Great Powers and various ethno-national groups seek to rend it apart. In this view, the Ottoman Empire has little volition or inclination to save itself from its "inevitable doom." While facets of this view are true, there are many other aspects of the end of the Empire that are rarely considered. Principally, the sustained war footing that the Ottoman Empire maintained from roughly 1910 through 1923. Frequently, the events of these 13 years are categorized as separate conflicts that quickened the "inevitable" destruction of the Ottoman Empire. There are numerous ways that these conflicts have been imagined and categorized. One of the most often repeated notions is the triumph of nationalism and imperialism over an "outdated" multinational empire. However, viewing the Empire strictly in military terms, presents a slightly different picture. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire suffered great defeats, but it maintained a war footing far longer than any other of the combatants in the First World War. But, perhaps, more importantly, the conflict the Ottoman Empire was engaged in was only partly related to the events that lead to the outbreak of the First World War in Europe.
This work will show that the Ottoman Empire was engaged in simultaneous internal and external conflict for more than a decade and was able to field and supply their military throughout this period. The conflicts flared up and died down, but remained constant for over a decade. In many cases there was constancy in the zones of conflict. Beginning in 1910, the Ottoman Empire was engaged in suppressing serious rebellions in Albania, Hawran, Karak, Yemen, and 'Asir. In 1911, rebellion still raged in Albania, Yemen, and 'Asir and war began with Italy. In 1912, rebellion was still active in Albania and 'Asir, war continued with Italy, and war began with the Balkan League. In 1913, rebellion continued in 'Asir, war continued with Bulgaria, and war began with the Saudis in eastern Arabia. In 1914–1918, the Ottoman Empire was involved in war with the Allies. In 1919–1922, war raged between the Ottoman/the nationalist governments and Greece, France, Britain, and the Republic of Armenia. Indeed, this continued conflict might be labeled the 13 Years War or the Transformational War, as the Imperial and later Republican governments sought to incorporate obstreperous groups, while simultaneously fighting against foreign powers. Thus, the young Ottoman army officers who were fighting rebels in Arabia and Albania in the beginning of 1910 found themselves at the start of a 13 year long war, a conflict that resulted in a profound transformation with the destruction of an old empire and the emergence of a new republic.1
More importantly, considering the aforementioned reality, a new framework will be utilized for the historiography of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. Rather than trying to fit the Ottoman Empire into the framework of the "European" idea of the First World War, 1914–1918. This work re-contextualizes the Ottoman experience in the First World War into a "long war"2 This perspective has been previously offered, to some degree, for this conflict.3 This author seeks to expand this idea and refine it further.
One of the main supports for this idea is the fact that in 1910 the Ottoman Empire declared a seferberlik, general mobilization, to support anti-insurrectionary operations in Albania, greater Syria, and Yemen, for this mobilization the Ottoman government called up over 350,000 Redifs, reserve troops, in addition to the already mobilized Nizams, regular troops. The Ottoman army eventually placed approximately 2,900,000 soldiers under arms, this Seferberlik continued from 1910 until the end of WWI.4 In many ways this mobilization only ended in 1922–1923, with the end of the war with Greece and the formal dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. One of the best sources for this approach are the memoirs of Ottoman officers who lived through this prolonged conflict. Their words show the continuity of this long war. Many recently published memoirs and even monographs emphasize the idea of prolonged struggle.5
Thus, the Ottoman experience was a part of, but also separate from the standard First World War experience.6 Even before the formal declaration of war in 1914, the Ottoman state had been on a war footing and engaged in conflict with Italy, the Balkan Powers, and the Saudis as well as tackling internal rebellion. The events of 1914 expanded the scope of fighting and some of the opponents, but many of the conflicts continued unabated. In 1918, despite the Allied occupation of Istanbul and the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, conflict continued in Anatolia and only ended in 1922–1923
Reframing the Ottoman Experience
Rather than using a traditional framework for the Ottoman Empire during the World War I, the conflict has been restructured to describe the major regions that were contested by Ottoman forces throughout the "long war" and, in many cases, even before the 1910. The reorientation of the conflict shows the continuity and focuses on the Ottoman perspective. What follows are brief summaries of the "fronts" or "battles" that were ongoing during the period in question. 7 Thus, this research focuses on the continuity of the conflict that the Ottoman Empire faced, while at the same time, the significant transformation that the Ottoman territories underwent as a result of this ongoing struggle. This work will only lay out a general framework, which will hopefully be developed in more depth at a later date by the author or other scholars.
The Battle for Centralization 1910–1914
One of the great issues of the last decades of Ottoman history was the struggle for centralization and reform. This had been an ongoing process since the inception of the Tanzimat (1839–1876), through the reign of Abdulhamid II (1877–1909), and ending with the Young Turks (1908–1918).8 This struggle between centralizing state and provincial elites and other groups pervaded all of the military reform and operations in this roughly 80 year period. This process gained momentum with the accession the CUP.
Not long after of the Young Turk Revolution a struggle between the CUP and outlying provincial groups as well as political rivals began to emerge. This struggle militarized as the CUP chose to use violence to reign in outlying provinces that were refusing to comply with the new measures, especially conscription. The CUP and the army would drag the Ottoman Empire into a new modern age, kicking and screaming if necessary. After all, in many CUP circles, amongst the army themselves, and amongst others in the Empire, the army was regarded as the Nigahban-ı Meşrutiyet, the Guardians of the Constitution.9 So, who better to initiate this new process then the Ottoman military? This was due to two main factors. The 1908 revolution /restoration of the constitution and the suppression of the 1909 counter-revolution were initiated by military forces under the command of CUP-affiliated officers.
Viewing this process another way, the CUP launched a war for centralization that resulted in what was tantamount to a civil war. Although not all areas of the Empire were opposed to the new regulations put in place by the CUP, the borderlands of the Empire strongly resisted the new regulations and obligations placed upon them. These regulations in most cases were a significant departure from the previous administration. As a result of this serious resistance mounted. The new regime had little tolerance for the idiosyncrasies of these territories. They wanted a standardized administration to be put in place and the populations of these territories needed to participate in the life of the Empire. The general opinion amongst some members of the CUP leadership became that these areas needed to pull their weight and stop being liabilities. This conflict resulted in significant military operations in the four years leading up to conflict with the Allies.10 These operations occurred simultaneously with the conflict between the Ottoman state and the Balkan League, Italy, and the Saudis.
The Rumelian Front 1910–1913
The contest over Rumelia/the Balkans was a continuing conflict which had lasted nearly a century when the Young Turk Revolution (1908) occurred. The desire for greater control and centralization, as illustrated above, pushed the CUP to be more assertive in Rumelia. More importantly, Rumelia was the main front interest for the Ottoman Military.11 For most of the Empire's history this peninsula was a core part of the Empire and the "homeland" of the CUP party.12 By the time of the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, there had been an ongoing guerilla war between the Ottoman government and various çete or bands. These bands were often directly or indirectly supported one of the Balkan Powers. Their existence created uncertainty in the region and in some ways fueled dissension amongst Albanians, who slowly began to turn to nationalism as the strong grip of the CUP's centralization took hold and yet the Ottoman grip on the Balkans was loosening. All of the other issues became unimportant with the sudden attack by the Balkan League in October of 1912. The Balkan Wars (1912–1913) devastated the Ottoman order in Rumelia. The Ottoman army was divided and defeated by the Balkan League by the winter of 1912. War was renewed as the former allies of Bulgaria turned against them, the Ottoman Empire took advantage of this and recaptured some lost territory, but, in essence, the Ottoman hold over the Balkan was lost. Despite this, Ottoman forces returned to Rumelia in 1916, now fighting in concert with their Central Power partners.
The Arabian /Levantine Front 1910–1918
Arabia and the Levant, except for Egypt, were of secondary importance for most Ottoman governments before the 19th century. By the middle of the 19th century, Ottoman interest in Arabia and the Levant increased. Challenged by the British, but also the French and local powers, the Ottoman Empire became much more engaged with theses territories.13 Between 1870 and 1910, Ottoman rule and influence expanded over a great part of Arabia. Ottoman power became more solidified in Yemen,'Asir, al-Hasa, and Qatar as well as in the Najd, the Syrian Desert, and southern Iraq. These moves alienated local groups and would-be potentates and bred resentment and, to some degree, nationalism that was utilized by the British in 1914–1918. As with the Balkans, many of the conflicts that became a part of "the First World War" were already underway, for example, the struggle between the Ottomans and the Idrisids in 'Asir had been ongoing since 1910.14 The struggle with the Saudis since the early 19th century and the rivalry with the Hashemites had been intermittent through much of the later 19th and early 20th centuries. Not only did Ottoman forces have an ongoing battle with various Arab groups, they also maintained a position in Arabia through 1919.15 Despite this, with their occupation by the Allies, the Arab Provinces of the Ottomans were lost. Later, the Kuvay-ı Milliye, the Nationalist Army and the Misak-ı Millî, the National Pact attempted to claim Aleppo and Mosul, but these claims never became a reality.16
The Anatolian Front 1914–1922
Anatolia became the last bastion of Ottoman resistance and the crucible from which the Turkish National government emerged. As the Arab Provinces were lost and hope of regaining them appeared unlikely, what remained of the Ottoman Army retired to Anatolia. Here the Ottoman Empire found old and new challenges. One lingering problem, as was also the case previously in Balkans, was ethnic intermixing and infighting. This had been a perpetual problem since the late 19th century. But, this continuing conflict began to crystalize into inter-ethnic violence. The massacre of Cilician Armenians in Adana and surrounding areas was the most recent event in 1909, but there had been many others throughout the latter half of the 19th century. With the reversal of Ottoman forces in 1915–1916, interethnic conflict bubbled over into full-scale civil war. The Ottoman government met these new challenges from Armenian groups with atrocities and forced migration. In turn, Armenian groups responded with violence and the spiral of violence twisted out of control as central authority evaporated. This pattern continued until the Armistice of Mudros of 1918 and with the Allied occupation of Istanbul 1918–1919.
The remnants of the Ottoman army, the Kemalist-Nationalist forces, and many, although not all, Kurdish tribal groups rallied to form the Kuvay-ı Milliye, the Nationalist Army. The Kuvay-ı Milliye, did also receive limited support from the Soviet Union. Armenians in eastern Anatolia and Cilicia, Pontic and Aegean Greeks, were supported by forces from the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Armenia, Britain, and France. Additionally, the Sultan's government opposed the Kuvay-ı Milliye, with the Kuvay-ı İnzibâtiyye, the Force of Order, a military force put in the field by the Sultan to assert his authority as the leader of the Ottoman Empire, although this had limited effectiveness and quickly disbanded. Thus, it became Armenian and Greek armies facing a "nationalist" Turkish army in Anatolia.17
The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) allotted Izmir (Smyrna) and its environs to Greece, established an independent Armenia in eastern Anatolia, and allotted parcels of Ottoman territory to France and Italy. The Treaty of Sèvres undermined the power of the Sultan and fueled the Kuvay-ı Milliye. Many former Ottoman officers, who had been active on the previous fronts now found themselves battling for Anatolia.18 By late 1921, French incursions into Cilicia were checked and reversed and France gave up on expanding its mandate in Syria and the Armenian Republic was dismantled, with the help of the Soviet Union. The struggle with the Greeks was more hotly contested. Slowly Greek forces were turned back and expelled from Anatolia. This final victory exacted a terrible for all the sides involved. In the process the Ottoman state's territory had dramatically contracted. Additionally, the composition and organization of the majority Ottoman army was transformed. The armed forces had "nationalized" and the Sultan's government was marginalized. The new republic in Ankara became the de facto government, which was firmly linked to the new army.19 This new reality was confirmed by the treaties of Kars in 1921 and the Lausanne in 1923.20
Seeing through the Eyes of Ottoman Soldiers
Aside from simply restructuring and reimaging the conflict in last decade of the Ottoman Empire, this work also draws on frequently underutilized sources, journals and memoirs of Ottoman officers and soldiers.21 These memoirs can often obscure some larger trends and focus, in a micro-historical way, on very specific events. However, they do reveal, indirectly, the way average Ottoman soldiers and junior officers lived the events in questions. This lived experience does not always fit neatly into the way most Euro-American historiography reconstructs the narrative of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War.
One interesting concept, at least from Fevzi Çakmak's journal, is that one conflict bleeds into another.22 For much of the first part of his journal Çakmak details anti-insurrectionary operations in the Albanian and Macedonian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. But this narrative bleeds almost seamlessly into the 1st Balkan War. This writing also reveals, the ongoing nature of rivalry with the Balkan Powers, in this case, Montenegro is foremost. Montenegro supported Albanian rebellions at least since 1910 and although a settlement was agreed upon between Albanian groups and the Ottoman government in early summer of 1912, Montenegro continued to probe the Ottoman frontier and arm Albanian rebellions. Montenegro preemptively attacked the Ottoman Empire before the other Balkan Powers in October of 1912 and never signed a peace treaty with the Ottoman state at the end of 1913, thus an ongoing, open-ended conflict from 1910 until at least 1918.23Additionally, the journal of Kazim Karabekir also lays out the continuum of the Transformational War. 24 Kazim Karabekir was involved with suppressing rebellion in Albania in 1910; he fought the Balkan League in 1912–1912, squared off against the Allies in 1914–1918, and fought the Republic of Armenia in 1919–1921.
While the schema laid out above could certainly be reorganized and altered, it seems clear that the rebellions of 1910 in the Albanian provinces, Yemen, and elsewhere, were but the beginning of a series of seemingly incessant conflicts that would eventually sunder the Ottoman Empire and lead to the formation of a new republic.
After battling internal dissension, the CUP and the Ottoman state fought to retain Libya and they desperately struggled to retain Rumelia. On both occasions defeat resulted in the loss of territory and an influx of refugees. A few months later, war with the Allies began. Engaged on several fronts, the Ottoman army simultaneously grappled with internal rebellions, many of which had been ongoing before the war with the Allies began. In many cases the Allies used or attempted to use this internal dissension to their advantage.25 Defeat and Allied occupation followed. The "Arab" provinces were cleaved off in an effort to hew a new order in the region. Anatolia became the rump of the Ottoman state. But this too was to be divvied up by the victorious Allies, including the Greeks. This aroused the formulation of a new identity, the idea of a "Turkish" state. This new rival government in Ankara reassembled some of the old Ottoman military formations and added a new populist element to drive the British, French, and Greeks from Anatolia. With the help of the Soviets, the Armenians were defeated as well and finally after thirteen years war was at an end. This violent transformation was devastating for the people involved and left all of the parties involved dissatisfied. The human cost was incredibly high and radically altered the post-War Middle East. While these conflicts have been categorized and imagined as separate conflicts, for the average Ottoman soldier and for many officers, the conflict was ongoing and seemingly ceaseless. In the process, the radical imperial reform of the CUP would give way to an equally, if not more radical, Kemalist agenda. Many of this generation, drawing on their past experiences in fighting at the far-flung corners of the Ottoman Empire for over a decade, now accepted the rump of the old empire as their new republican state, despite the fact that most of them had never resided there. Past experience had led them to conclude that the construction of a shared identity was a necessity to be pursued at almost any price. There would be no room for federalism, for hyphenated identities, for protected minorities who could serve as wedges of interference by outside powers. Equally, few of them desired to reconstitute the Empire. Many of them had spilled blood to secure the loyalty of and maintain the territorial integrity of numerous outlying provinces, but to no avail. Jaded and scorned, most turned away from the "big" imperial project and came to be contented with the new Turkey.
James N. Tallon, is Assistant Professor of History at Lewis University. His research interests favor the late Ottoman Empire, State Formation, Nationalism, the Military and Society, and Imperialism. His teaching fields include Modern Middle East, Turkey, Iran, the Ottoman Empire, History of the Mediterranean, Early Islam, The Balkans, Islamic Civilization, Nationalism, Historiography, Islamic Africa, and Islamic India.
1 An Ottoman officer, in the period in question, entitled his memoir the Ten Year War , this work slightly expands this idea, see Fahrettin Altay, 10 yıl savaş, 1912–1922, ve sonrası. Istanbul: İnsel Yayınları, 1970.
2 This idea draws on the same idea as a concept like the Long 19th century 1789–1914 that certain factors or events shape a period, not simply a chronological frame. Here, with the Ottoman Empire, events pre-dating and post-dating the standard 1914–1918 frame of the First World War. Like the Ottoman Empire/Republic of Turkey, the Russian Empire/Soviet Union where conflicted raged from 1914–1923, Iran too faced a prolonged, open-ended conflict 1914–1921, and Albania also suffered from perpetual, unsettled conflict 1912–1924.
4 Edward J. Erickson. Ordered to Die: History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2001), 1–15 and 243 et al. provide similar numbers. There was frequent desertion amongst Ottoman ranks and occasionally soldiers were re-conscripted.
5 Yücel Demirel, ed. Kazim Karabekir Günlükler (1906–1948) 1. Cilt (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi
Yayınları, 2009) and Nilüfer Hatemi, Mareşal Fevzi Çakmak. (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002) are the primary memoirs I have examined, but there are others. As for monographs that have a similar scope, see George Gawrych. The Young Atatürk: From Ottoman Soldier to Statesman of Turkey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013).
6 This is the case with other conflicts. They are often categorized and presented differently depending on the context. Thus, the War of Austrian Succession (1740–1747) can be conceived of from a British/American perspective, as the War of Jenkins's Ear 1739–1748, from a British/Indian perspective as the First Carnatic War 1746–1748, from a Prussian/German/ Austrian perspective as the First Silesian War 1740–1742 and the Second Silesian War 1744–1745. Similarly, the Seven-Years War (1756–1763) includes the North American conflict, the French and Indian War/War of Conquest, the Indian conflict, the Third Carnatic War 1757–1763, the Central European conflict, the Third Silesian War, 1754–1763, and the Scandinavian conflict, thePomeranian War 1757–1762. Viewing things this way, the Ottoman's Transformational War 1910–1923 fits into the European First World War 1914–1918, but it also has other considerations besides the conflict with the Allies, 1914–1918.
7 There could be included in this schema a Battle for the Caucasus and a Battle for North Africa, as there were long-standing conflicts in these areas as well, but these were of less interest to Ottoman civil and military officials and therefore have not been included.
8 İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti, the Committee of Union and Progress henceforth abbreviated CUP.
9 M. Naim Turfan, Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military and Ottoman Collapse (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 131–284.
10 Details concerning the concept of the "War for Centralization" can be seen in James N. Tallon "The Failure of Ottomanism: The Albanian Rebellions of 19090–1912" University of Chicago, PhD diss., June 2012, 111–125.
11 It was also home to some of the largest cities, ports, and the main rail links to Europe, not to mention, it was one of the most agricultural productive in the Empire
12 For a discussion of this ideas see: Erik Jan Zürcher, "The Young Turks – Children of the Borderlands?" Turkology Update, Leiden Project Working Papers Archive. (October, 2002): 1–9.
13 The Saudis of the Najd, the Idrisids of 'Asir, the house of Al-Sabah in Kuwait were rivals of the Ottomans, while the Rashidis of Ha'il, the Hashemites of the Hijaz, and the Al-Thani of the Qatar were often, although not always, allies of the Ottoman Empire.
14 Not only were the Idrisids backed by the British in 1914–1918, but they had been previously been given support by the Italians in 1911–1912, see John Baldry. "Turkish-Italian War in the Yemen." Arabian Studies. (Volume 3,
1976): 51–65; John Baldry. "Anglo-Italian Rivalry in Yemen and ʿAsīr 1900–1934."Die Welt des Islams New Series, (Vol. 17, Issue 1/4 1976–1977), 155–193 and Lenci, Marco. "La Campagna Italiana nel Mar Rosso Durant La Guerra di Libia e La Rivolta Antiturcadi AL-Idrisi nell '`Asir." Storia Contemporane.a (16, no. 5/6 September 1985): 971–1000.
15 An Ottoman garrison held Medina and other Ottoman forces controlled most of Yemen, until they were evacuated in 1918–1919.
16 These claims were abandoned after League of Nations arbitration in 1926, but the Turkish Republic received 10% of the oil revenue from Mosul for the next 25 years. Most of the old Vilayet of Halep (Aleppo) was awarded to the Turkey with the Treaty of Lausanne 1923, except for the city of Aleppo itself. Later, in 1938–1939 , the Turkish republic was successful in incorporating Hatay, which had been part of French Syria.
17 There was also the so-called Franco-Turkish War in Cilicia 1919–1921, but the main conflicts were focused on "national" aspiration.
18 A few examples of these officers are Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Fevzi Çakmak, Kazim Karabekir, Ismet İnönü, Fahrettin Altay, İzzet Pasha, and others. In some ways these men link the continuity of the conflict.
19 Stanford Shaw. From Empire to Republic Vols. I–V. (Ankara: Türk Tarihi Kurumu, 2001)
20 The treaty of Kars of 1921 settled the eastern boundary of the Turkish Republic with the Soviet Union and the former Caucasian republics, while the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 settled the western frontier with Greece, Great Britain, and France.
21 Many studies of Ottoman military history, in Turkish and in other languages continue to rely heavily on official histories and archival documents. Some Turkish scholars have drawn on these, but most non-Turkish authors have not. As mentioned earlier, George Gawrych is an exception to this statement. He extensively used Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's memoirs and personal papers to craft a very interesting monograph, The young Atatürk: from Ottoman soldier tostatesman of Turkey. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013).
22 The latest edition consulted was Nilüfer Hatemi, Mareşal Fevzi Çakmak ve Günlükleri, cilt I.. (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002), but earlier, Nilüfer Hatemi, "Unfolding a Life: Marshal Fevzi Çakmak's Diaries Vols. I & II." Ph.D diss., was also consulted.
24 Yücel Demirel, ed., Kazim Karabekir Günlükler (1906–1948) 1. Cilt (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2009).
25 The British made contact with Idrisids in 'Asir and the Saudis in the Najd during the war. The most significant of these was their alliance with the Hashemites of the Hijaz . Italy also supported the Idrisids in 1911–1912 when they battled the Ottomans over Libya.
|Home | List Journal Issues | Table of Contents|
|© 2015 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois|
Content in World History Connected is intended for personal, noncommercial use only. You may not reproduce, publish, distribute, transmit, participate in the transfer or sale of, modify, create derivative works from, display, or in any way exploit the World History Connected database in whole or in part without the written permission of the copyright holder.